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been introduced on the subject.8 ' None have emerged from the committees to which they were referred.
The Court's adoption of the rule of apportionment now assumes a
more favorable light.8 2 The administrative problem is admittedly
formidable, and even partial solution requires working cooperation
between tax administrators who devise and apply apportionment schemes,
and the courts who declare and enforce the basic standard. That Congress retains its power to enter this field is undoubted, but until and
unless it does, the responsibility for a workable solution rests with the
Court. Its most recent pronouncements indicate that it has accepted that
responsibility.

PROTECTION ACCORDED A PURCHASER OF LAND
FROM A DEFAULT JUDGMENT PLAINTIFF
Whenever rights in real property are being litigated, the land may
be privately sold or mortgaged to a stranger to the suit.1 Such transaction may occur before final judgment, after final judgment but preceding appeal, 2 during appeal, or subsequent to the time allowed for
appeal. Legislative and judicial stagnation necessitates an inquiry into
the protection afforded to purchaser after the time for appeal has run.
This investigation is thus limited in scope because a person buying
property through private sale during the time when an appeal may be
taken, is generally on constructive notice that an action relating to the
land is pending.3 The fundamental limitations upon which the buyer's
rights are contingent are the operation of lis pendens after the time
81. H.R. 3446, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 1241, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947) ; S. 2453, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) ; S. 420, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
82. Application of that rule is justified wherever the use of the vehicle in question
is such that there is a substantial connection with more than one state, without regard
for the fact that the vehicle is a railroad car, a water vessel, or an airplane. In this
connection, the limitation of the Ott and Peck holdings to vessels moving on inland
waters, see note 15 supra, hardly seems a priori justified for all cases of taxes on oceangoing ships.
1. A private sale must be distinguished from a judicial sale with reference to the
rights of purchasers. The purpose of protecting a purchaser at a judicial sale is not
merely to keep land alienable, but primarily to promote bidding at public sales. Lord v.
Hawkins, 39 Minn. 73, 38 N.W. 689 (1888) ; Mach v. Blanchard, 15 S.D. 432, 90 N.W.
1042 (1902).
2. See the discussion of the rights of a purchaser where judgment is set aside
before time for appeal has run in Tainter, Restitution of Property Transferred Under
Void or Later Reversed Judgments. 9 Miss. L._. 157, 179 and n.133 (1936).
3. E.g., Maedel v. Wies, 309 Mich. 424, 15 N.W.2d 692 (1944); Stuart v. Coleman,
78 Okla. 81, 188 Pac. 1063 (1920).

NOTES
for appeal has run, so that a purchaser is not protected, and the common
law theory that a vendee took only the interest that his vendor had.
Often, in situations where real estate is involved, a defendant, served
personally or by publication, will fail to appear, resulting in a default
judgment in the plaintiff's favor. This is especially true where the action
4
is one to quiet title and unknown defendants are served by publication.
Most states have provided, by statute or case law, a means by which a
default judgment may be set aside, thus allowing the defaulting party
5
to come in and defend.
A default judgment, a purchaser of real property after the time
for appeal, and the setting aside of the judgment all result in the problem
at hand. The following example illustrates how the problem may arise.
P sues to quiet title to Blackacre. D, served either by process or publication, fails to appear. The court finds that title belongs in P, and
no appeal being taken, P sells Blackacre to T. Within the statutory
period the judgment is set aside on a motion by D, who proves a claim
superior to P. Who is entitled to Blackacre, T or D? Which party
will be relegated to a suit against P for the loss sustained ?o
The courts have not articulated the interests which have influenced
their decisions in this situation. The innocence of a purchaser probably
would not carry much weight on these facts. If a rule were adopted
which did not protect a purchaser, he would know that he could not
safely rely on a default judgment for the period during which it may be
set aside. This fact, coupled with the court's probable inclination to
aid a defaulting party who establishes his interest in the real estate,
4. E.g., State ex rel. Karsch v. Eby, 218 Ind. 431, 33 N.E.2d 336 (1941) ; Tawney
v. Blankenship, 150 Kan. 41, 90 P.2d 1111 (1939).
5. Most statutes provide that a defendant may, by showing "mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect" have a default judgment set aside. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1068
(Burns Repl. 1946); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 93-3905 (1947). Some states word their
statutes to grant relief "for unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party
from prosecuting or defending." E.g., OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 11631 (1938); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 1031 (1951). Still another type statute allows a person who has been
served by publication to come in for a specified number of months or years, and have
default set aside. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2601 (Burns Repl. 1946); S.D. CODE
§ 33.0815 (1939). Many states have both "excusable neglect" and "publication" statutes.
Where a publication statute does not exist, the defendant presumably must obtain relief
under the excusable neglect statute. For additional citations to the various statutes, see
Appendix, p. 238 infra.
6. This discussion deals with a situation where a judgment is not void, for it is
within the court's power to render the judgment. The judgment can only be attacked
directly, and the excusable neglect and publication .statutes provide a means for such
attack. Only where the court renders a judgment improper on its face or without
jurisdiction, is the judgment void and incapable of passing any rights to a purchaser.
Such judgment does not affect the defendant's claim of title. Kavanagh v. Hamilton,
53 Colo. 157, 125 Pac. 512 (1912); Clark v. Carolina Homes, 189 N.C. 703, 128 S.E.
20 (1925).
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encourages adoption of a rule allowing the defendant to recover the
land from the purchaser.
Such a rule, however, will impair the alienability of real property.
If a person desiring to buy realty knows his title will be defeasible, he
will not purchase unless he can do so at a reduced price. To forestall sale of land at its full value for several years is unfair to the
plaintiff, who may be the rightful owner. Preventing a successful party
from enjoying the benefit of his judgment and impairing the alienability
of land for an inordinate length of time would be forcible reasons
persuading the judiciary to protect a purchaser.
As indicated, the courts have based their decisions upon technical
grounds with no reference to the interests of the parties affected. The
opinions of several supreme courts give evidence of three approaches
to the problem. The language in Macih v. Blanchard7 indicates that
because a judgment may be set aside and the suit reopened, the suit
is still pending;" consequently, the purchaser is on constructive notice
of defendant's rights and buys the land subject to those rights. The
same result was reached in Lord v. Hawkins, which case adopted the
rule that the vendee takes only what his plaintiff-vendor had; since the
vendor merely had defeasible title, which could fall with the setting
aside of a default judgment and a new trial, the vendee received the
same limited rights. 9 At variance with the preceding cases, Van Noy v.
7. 15 S.D. 432, 90 N.W. 1042 (1902). The default judgment plaintiff mortgaged
land before the time for appeal had run. By statute an action in South Dakota was
deemed pending for that length of time. S.D. CODE § 33.0104 (1939). The defendant
then succeeded in getting the default set aside for excusable neglect and brought an
action to cut off the mortgagee's interest. The mortgagee was clearly on constructive
notice since the action was still pending.
The legislature may have interpreted this case to mean that the purchaser is never
to be protected, for it has subsequently enacted statutes expressly protecting a purchaser where a default judgment is set aside for excusable neglect or because defendant
was served by publication. S.D. CODE §§ 37.1514, 33.0815 (1939). There is language in
the case to support this interpretation. The court said that "[o]ne who purchases a
judgment takes it at the peril of having it vacated or reversed. Why should the
defendant in this action [a mortgagee of land] stand in any better position than the
assignee of a money judgment?" Mach v. Blanchard, supra at 441, 90 N.W. at 1044.
This is the common law view that a vendee takes what the vendor has. On its facts,
however, the case is limited to the rights of a purchaser or mortgagee before the time
for appeal has run.
8. When an action is originally brought, and notice is filed as a state statute may
require, any purchaser is on constructive notice of the action and takes subject to its
outcome. The question then becomes, how long is the action deemed pending? According
to the language in the Mach case the action may pend as long as the judgment may be
set aside under an excusable neglect or publication statute.
9. 39 Minn. 73, 38 N.W. 689 (1888). The doctrine of Lord v. Hawkins in so far
as it affects the purchaser, still governs in Minnesota. Carl v. DeToffal, 223 Minn. 24,
25 N.W.2d 479 (1946). The rule has been modified by statute so that a purchaser in
good faith is protected after judgment has been undisturbed for three years. MINN.
STAT. ANx. § 544.32 (1946).

NOTES
Jackson states that when the time for appeal has run, the action is no
longer pending; a subsequent purchaser with no actual notice of defendant's rights is in good faith and is protected if the judgment is set aside
and the defendant wins on new trial. 10
In most states today the time for appeal varies from twenty to
ninety days." During this period, according to the Van Noy case,
a purchasing party cannot safely rely upon a default judgment; the
defendant may, if the judgment is set aside and he is victorious on
new trial, have restitution in specie. When the time for appeal has
run, the purchaser knows that if he buys in good faith, he will be
protected; he is no longer on constructive notice of defendant's rights
because the action is no longer pending. The defendant must then
obtain restitution of thie money-equivalent of the property value from
the original plaintiff.
This solution appears to be sound with regard to all parties concerned; in Indiana and a few other states, however, statutes provide
that an infant or disabled person shall have the right to appeal after
such disability is removed. 1 2 In a recent Indiana case, Attica Building
and Loan Association v. Colvert, this statute was held to keep a suit pending so that a purchaser (mortgagee) would not be protected when the
infant had the judgment set aside; the purchaser was deemed to be on a
constructive notice of the infant's interest.' 3
The wisdom of statutes allowing an infant to appeal upon reaching majority is not now in issue. A decision, however, that the statute
keeps the suit pending beyond the normal time for appeal, which would
usually terminate pendency, appears to be unfair. Title to land is thus
rendered uncertain for an unreasonable and indefinite period of time.
For example, if a minor is five years old when a judgment adversely
10. 68 Okla. 44, 171 Pac. 462 (1918). In this case the judgment was set aside for
fraud under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1031 (1951). This statute also contains a provision
for setting a judgment aside for defendant for "unavoidable casualty or misfortune
preventing a party from prosecuting or defending"; undoubtedly, this case would also be
authority for protection of a purchaser where a judgment was vacated under the "unavoidable casualty" provision. This is similar to "excusable neglect." The publication
statute in Oklahoma gives express protection to the purchaser. OXLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 176
(1951). Identical to these two Oklahoma statutes are enactments in Kansas, Nebraska,
Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming, except that Ohio and Wyoming expressly protect the
purchaser where judgment is set aside for "unavoidable casualty" as well as where the
judgment is vacated under publication statute. See Appendix, p. 238 infra.
11. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. RULE 2 (Rules on Appeal) (1949); IND. Sup. CT.
RULE 2-2; Onio GEN. CODE ANN. § 12223-7 (Supp. 1951).
12. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3202 (Burns Repl. 1946); Ky. CODES CIv. PRAc. § 391;
NEB. RZv. STAT. § 25-1931 (Supp. 1951). No cases are found in Kentucky and Nebraska
as to whether or not minor's right to appeal keeps the action pending.
13. 216 Ind. 192, 23 N.E.2d 483 (1939).
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affecting him is entered, the action will be pending until he is twenty-two
years old-one year after the cessation of the disability. Any purchaser
during the seventeen year period is on constructive notice of the infant's
rights; if default judgment is set aside during this period, the purchaser
is not protected if the minor can prove he has a valid interest.
It is noteworthy that the Attica case was based upon a statute
allowing a defendant to set aside a judgment for error.1 4 Logically,
where a judgment is set aside under an excusable neglect statute, the
same rule should apply.' 5 The Supreme Court of Indiana could, however, distinguish the two situations by saying either that pendency only
applies in an action brought under a statute to set aside judgment for
error since review for error is similar to review on appeal, or that the
Indiana excusable neglect statute provides that an action to set aside
be brought by complaint rather than motion. 16 It is, therefore, a new
proceeding unaffected by the pendency of the original suit, and the
purchaser is protected.
Since few judicial decisions are in point on the question of whether
a purchaser is to be protected or not, a clearer picture of how the
problem is handled must be obtained from legislative enactments.
Federal Rule 60(b) provides for relief against a judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect";17 the rule further states
that "a motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation." Although no cases have
interpreted this clause, its purpose is probably to protect all bona fide
interests obtained in reliance on the validity of the judgment; this
interpretation, of course, would leave a purchaser's rights in property
unaffected by the vacation of a judgment through the operation of
which his title is derived. Also, Section 1655 of the Judicial Code
allows a defaulting party served by publication to have a judgment
set aside within one year of rendition,' 8 but contains no statement concerning treatment of a purchaser.' 9
As demonstrated by the Appendix, many state legislatures have
14. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2604 (Burns Repl. 1946).
15. Id. § 2-1068.
16. In many states action to set aside is brought on a motion. E.g., ARIZ.
ANN. § 21-1502 (1939); GA. CODE AN. § 110-404 (Supp. 1951).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

CODE

18. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (Supp. 1952).
19. Where the federal court sits in a diversity of citizenship case deciding rights
in land, there may be a conflict under federal and state law as to whether a purchaser
of such land is to be protected if the judgment is set aside. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), there is a question whether this is a substantive or procedural

matter.

NOTES
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expressly protected a bona fide purchaser. More states have done so
when a judgment is set aside for a defendant served by publication
than when a defendant requests relief because of excusable neglect. 20
Undoubtedly, this result arises out of a legislature's ability to readily
perceive the likelihood that the rights of a purchaser of land may be
affected when a defendant served by publication has a judgment vacated,
for such service is most often used in actions concerning title to land.
Excusable neglect statutes, however, allow a defaulting defendant to
seek relief in any type of action. In states having both publication and
excusable neglect statutes, no reason is apparent for not treating a
vendee the same regardless of the statute used to set aside the judgment.
Some states, without expressly protecting the purchaser under either
statute, have provided, by legislative enactment, that an action is pending only until the suit is determined on appeal or the time for appeal
has run.21 Following the reasoning of Van Noy v. Jackson 2 2 the purchaser would be protected because the suit is not pending after the
time for appeal and the person buying property is not on constructive
notice. This interpretation was probably intended by these statutes.
A few states not only provide that pendency ceases when time
for appeal has run, but also provide that the purchaser in good faith
will be protected. In these states the vendee's rights obviously are
unharmed. 23 But where a state has only one of the two provisions,
there is room for judicial undermining of the intent to protect the
purchaser. A court could find, where the purchaser in good faith is
expressly protected, some ground to keep the suit pending ;24 a purchaser would then be on constructive notice and not "in good faith."
And, even if a suit is pending only until time for appeal has run, a
court may adopt the reasoning in Lord v. Hawkins, 25 that a' vendee
only receives the property rights of his vendor. Though no cases are
20. These states expressly protect a purchaser when judgment is set aside under
publication statute: Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma. The following states' statutes expressly protect a purchaser
whether judgment is set aside under publication statute or for excusable neglect:
Montana, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. The following states

have protected the purchaser where judgment was set aside for excusable neglect:
Illinois, Kentucky, and Oklahoma. See Appendix, p. 238 infra.
21. California, Florida, Idaho, North Dakota, and Virginia. See Appendix, p. 238
infra.

22. 68 Okla. 44, 171 Pac. 462 (1918) ; see note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
23. Montana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah. See Appendix,
p. 238 infra.
24. A court may find a suit pending where an infant has the right to appeal or

because the judgment may be set aside for excusable neglect on a motion by the
defendant.
25. 39 Minn. 73, 38 N.W. 689 (1888).
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found which adopt these positions in contravention to a clear legislative
intent to protect the purchaser, a court which feels strongly about protecting a defaulting defendant who subsequently attempts to set aside
judgment, may use legalistic doctrine to accord him restitution in
specie. Thus, complete legislative protection is required.
The growing number of states which have expressly protected the
purchaser have undoubtedly been motivated by a desire to enable a judgment plaintiff to readily sell the land, not only for his benefit, but
also to promote the productivity of land. To prevent the sale of property for a short period-the time allowed for appeal, for instancewould not place an unreasonable burden upon the land or the plaintiff.
In recommended legislation, therefore, it would be wise, first, to provide defendant a brief interim during which he could come in and
obtain restitution in specie; second, to protect an innocent purchaser
who buys the property after the lapse of a specified time, so that he
can ascertain when he may safely buy; third, to leave the rights of the
purchaser unaffected when judgment is set aside thereafter under either
an excusable neglect or publication statute.
States having statutes identical to Ohio and Oklahoma need do
no more than parallel the case law in those states to reach this result,
for their legislative and judicial design is harmonious with this view. 20
Where no cases or statutes expressly protect the purchaser, the following
recommendations are submitted for legislative enactments or supreme
court rules, whichever is adaptable to the state practice;
An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its
commencement until its final determination on appeal, or until
the time2 7for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner
satisfied.
If a state's period for appeal lasts an unreasonably long time, 28 or
the state has no definite period within which to appeal, the following
legislation is recommended:
An action is deemed to be pending for2 9thirty (or up to
ninety) days after final judgment is entered.
The above proposals have as their purpose the limitation of the
pendency of action and, thus, constructive notice to the purchaser of
26. Kansas, Nebraska, Washington, and Wyoming. See Appendix, p. 238 infra.
27. The following states have similar statutes: California, Idaho, Montana, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. See Appendix, p. 238 infra.
28. This would include states allowing an infant to appeal after disability is
raised, for such provision may keep a suit pending for as long as twenty-two years.

29.

IowA CODE ANN.,

c. 617, § 15 (1950).

NOTES

land; the defendant is still given a reasonable time in which to appeal
or have a default set aside and procure complete restitution. If a
defendant takes no action, a purchaser knows when he can safely buy
land.
Also in accord with provisions of the usual excusable neglect and
publication statutes, the following protection is recommended for the
purchaser:
1. The court may relieve a defendant from a default judgment
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect for a period of ----years after
rendition of judgment. Relief shall be a new trial. (typical
excusable neglect statute)
2. Parties against whom judgment is rendered without other
notice than by publication, except in cases of divorce, may,
at any time within ---- years after date of rendition of
judgment, have same opened, and be allowed to defend.
(typical publication statute)
3. If the title to real property, which is the subject of the
judgment sought to be opened under the two preceding
sections, has passed to a purchaser in good faith, the
purchaser shall remain unaffected by the results of the
proceeding. For the purposes of this statute, a purchaser
in good faith shall be one who buys property for value after
pendency of the original action has ended and who has no
actual notice of the rights of a defendant when the purchaser buys the real property relying on default judgment. 30
Without doubt, forcible policy reasons prompt the preservation
of the rights of a stranger to an action who purchases the real estate
in litigation. A defendant who fails to come in and defend, though his
action is justified, should not be able to impair the alienability of land
for a long period of time. If a default judgment plaintiff can only
pass disputed title to a purchasing party, the consequence must be to
force the plaintiff to sell at a reduced price or to hold the land until
the judgment can no longer be contested, either result being unreasonable. Thus, to maintain the alienability of land, the purchaser must be
protected. Actions concerning real estate are, of course, subject to
lis pendens notice; and during that time a purchaser buys subject to
the outcome of the action; but when the parties' rights are litigated
and an appeal can no longer be taken, there is no sound reason why
pendency should not cease. States which have not already done so
should take action to give their courts a clear mandate to protect an
innocent vendee in this situation.
30. This proposal is derived from statutes of Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota.
See Appendix, p. 238 infra.
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